By Fiona Mullen
This week, as the Personal Envoy to the UN Secretary-General (PESG), María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar, arrived on the island for the first time in months, there was a frisson of excitement that things might be about to start moving again on the decades-old Cyprus problem (“Cyprob”).
The reason for the excitement was a string of articles suggesting that we might be heading for a “strategic agreement” on the Cyprus problem by the end of the year, starting with a “roadmap” that will be presented by the UN Secretary-General, António Guterres, at a 5+1 meeting in later July or early August. The 5+1 will comprise Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and the three guarantor powers: Greece, Turkey and the UK.
Here, in the order in which they were published, are some of the key articles that include similar elements: Andreas Pimbishis in Phileleftheros, Stefanos Evripidou in Politis to the Point and Yusuf Kanlı on Substack.
New elements include EU engagement at very high levels; what looks like a phased approach, in which a referendum would be held some years after a staged process of gradual cooperation has begun; a recognition (at long last) that the regional context is relevant and should be taken into account; a potential for energy to form part of the equation (as I have long argued for, most recently here); and potential for NATO or NATO countries to play a part in security arrangements (something I wrote about here).
Recognize that a solution is a very hard sell for Greek Cypriots…
Among my pro-rapprochement friends, the flurry of articles was coupled with a fear that the rollercoaster of hope will end up in the ditch again. This is because, among the many structural obstacles in the old methodology for solving the Cyprus problem (which I wrote about here) there is another problem, namely that, for Greek Cypriots, a solution of the Cyprus problem is an extremely hard sell.
Why is this? First, because, notwithstanding the power-sharing constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots have been running the country by themselves for 63 of the 66 years since independence in 1960. They are fully recognized members of the EU, with all the trappings that go with that status. Despite a big financial crisis in 2013, the economy thrives: real GDP growth almost always outstrips the EU; and incomes, adjusted for purchasing power, are 98% of the EU average.
In short, unlike the Turkish Cypriots, whose incomes are far lower and who have plenty of incentives to be finally living in an internationally recognized state, the Greek Cypriots have very few incentives to take the big psychological leap.
Adopting a staged approach, if that is indeed the plan, goes a long way to managing Greek Cypriot fears. But to get the political class on board, you need something else.
Below, therefore, is an idea for how to make sure that the next attempt to solve the Cyprus problem does not end up in the ditch.
…so combine the sticks…
One indirect way of incentivizing the Greek Cypriots is built into the four points insisted upon by the Turkish Cypriot leader, Tufan Erhürman, before any negotiations can start.
Image source: the four points of Tufan Erhürman: Cumhuriyet via Google Translate.
As well as protecting Turkish Cypriots, the Point 4 safeguard also kind of acts as an incentive for Greek Cypriots to stay the course. However, depending on how “no return to the status quo” is defined, it might also prevent the Greek Cypriots from getting into negotiations in the first place. Or worse, it might encourage them to work out how to scupper them once they do start.
…with some big geopolitical carrots
This is why I am appealing for carrots, specifically Greek Cypriot carrots. I say this as someone who sat at the negotiating table as a Political Affairs Officer in the Good Offices team during the Christofias-Talat period, was closely involved as a consultant up to early 2016 (plus on an ad hoc basis from 2018) and of course followed the Annan Plan closely before that.
What I noticed is that, with leader after leader, every time the Greek Cypriots were cajoled into meetings or potential convergences that they did not want they found a way of ensuring that, to put it diplomatically, the outcome was not what everyone else was looking for.
So how do we prevent this from happening again? We add a nice, juicy carrot.
What should that carrot be? I don’t think economic arguments are enough. Lord knows I have tried. You can find the five publications I have co-authored on the economic benefits of a Cyprus settlement if you scroll here. The most recent one from 2020 is here.
I suspect that hopes of return will not be a strong enough pull any more either. The 2021 census shows that more than 60% of the resident population of the Republic of Cyprus was born after 1974.
However, we do need something that will resonate emotionally, both with ordinary Greek Cypriots and with Greek Cypriot political elites.
What could that be? Having lived among Greek Cypriots for a quarter of a century now, I really believe that it needs to be something that makes Greek Cypriots feel geopolitically important. Remember, Cyprus is a small island that has had foreign armies run over it for thousands of years. The pride which Greek Cypriots felt when they finally joined the EU, despite all the odds, was palpable. People would joke to each other, “we are European now”.
A carrot that says, “if you solve the Cyprus problem you will get this big geopolitical upgrade” will help turn a Cyprus settlement into something people will inevitably feel uncertain about to something that they can look forward to.
The “East Med Strategic Centre of Defence”
My suggestion is that EU member states promise that, if we reach a settlement, Cyprus will house a big new important “Eastern Mediterranean Strategic Centre for Defence”. I say defence because it is a geopolitically heavyweight subject. (A “peace centre” would not cut it.) Another could be energy but it looks as though the Egyptians have nabbed that already, in the form of the East Mediterranean Gas Forum (EMGF).
The new “Eastern Mediterranean Strategic Centre for Defence” will have a big secretariat to keep civil servants happy. It will have lots of buildings to keep the developers happy. There will be lots of bi-annual meetings to create photo opportunities for the politicians and to keep the tourism sector happy. And there will be plenty of spin-offs to keep the lawyers, accountants, forex and ICT companies happy. To ensure that it is not too one-sided in favour of Greek Cypriots, it will be housed in what is now the buffer zone and will of course have Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot employees.
The one caveat to this idea is that, if the EU is heading towards its own defence capabilities that are independent of NATO, there will be a lot of competition for where to house the new defence club. This is why I added the “East Med” at the beginning. That might still make Greece and Turkey jealous, as they, too, would want to have it. But this is why it needs to be packaged as part of a broader deal that brings longlasting peace to the island, as well as plenty of benefits for Greece and Turkey too.
Turkish Cypriots might complain that, even if it is housed in the buffer zone, this idea is very one-sided: where are the big carrots for them?
My answer is this: if we do finally address the structurally flawed process by introducing a phased process, the biggest remaining obstacle to reaching the deal will be an absence of big incentives for the Greek Cypriot leadership. If you want a solution, therefore, you will also want incentives that get the Greek Cypriots over the final line.
This article first appeared on SapientaCyprus.Substack.com.
