The long-running debate over the absence of effective institutional checks and balances in the Cyprus Constitution continues, with no substantive reform despite years of discussion. According to Dr Costas Paraskeva, President of the Law Department at the University of Cyprus and Associate Professor of Public Law and Human Rights, the consequences are now visible, raising concerns about excessive concentration of power and gradual erosion of democratic safeguards.
Paraskeva is among the speakers at a public discussion titled “Institutional checks and balances of the Cyprus Constitution: dead ends and choices”, taking place tomorrow at the University of Cyprus (18:00), organised by the Law Department and the Law Library. Other speakers include Aristos Damianou, George Pamboridis and Nikitas Hadjiimichael, with Eleni Meleagrou moderating.
Concentration of power in the presidency
When you refer to a lack of institutional checks, what exactly is missing from the system today?
The problem lies mainly in the expanded powers accumulated by the President of the Republic following the collapse of the constitutional structure in 1963. Since 1964, the President has held a dominant position, as the bicommunal executive model no longer functions. This is directly linked to the absence of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President, a role that remains vacant.
Why have these checks and balances effectively disappeared?
The constitutional framework agreed in 1960 was built on power-sharing between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. With the withdrawal of Turkish Cypriots from state institutions, that structure collapsed. As a result, the principle of bicommunalism, which underpinned the Constitution, no longer operates.
Since then, governance has relied on the “doctrine of necessity”, which allowed the state to continue functioning despite the breakdown of the constitutional order. While this ensured survival, it also means the Republic effectively operates outside parts of its own Constitution. Many provisions regulating the structure of the state have remained inactive since 1964, placing Cyprus in what Paraskeva describes as a state of constitutional limbo.
How the doctrine of necessity reshaped the system
What does this doctrine mean in practice for how the state operates?
It allows institutions to function without the participation of Turkish Cypriots. As a result, key bodies, including the courts, the Council of Ministers and the House of Representatives, are composed solely of Greek Cypriots.
In some cases, institutions have ceased to exist altogether, such as the office of the Turkish Cypriot Vice President. In others, positions intended for Turkish Cypriots are now filled by Greek Cypriots, including senior legal and auditing roles.
What does the absence of checks and balances mean in everyday terms?
Institutional checks are safeguards that limit political power. Their absence means that citizens have, often without realising it, been living for decades in a system that operates outside its constitutional framework.
This has effectively required society to accept a compromise: tolerating an incomplete constitutional order in order to maintain the functioning of the state.
Impact on fundamental rights
Does this affect the protection of rights?
Yes. While the Constitution incorporates key protections from the European Convention on Human Rights, those protections depend on a functioning institutional framework.
With the collapse of the system of checks and balances, the broader structure that supports the rule of law has been weakened, with consequences for how rights are safeguarded in practice.
How important was the Turkish Cypriot Vice President in maintaining balance within the system?
Its importance is often underestimated. The Vice President held significant powers, including veto authority on foreign policy, defence and security matters, as well as joint responsibility for key appointments.
Since 1964, these powers have effectively been transferred to the President alone. This has removed a key counterweight within the system and contributed directly to what can be described as presidential dominance.
A system vulnerable to overreach
What does it mean in practice that the presidency operates as a one-person institution?
In the absence of institutional counterbalances, it becomes easier for a President to exceed their role. The presidency now functions as a highly centralised authority.
The electoral process alone does not guarantee restraint. Without structural checks, the distinction between institutional authority and personal power can become blurred.
Does this concentration of power pose a risk to democracy?
Yes. When personal authority begins to dominate institutional structures, it can influence decisions across the system, including appointments. Over time, this leads to institutional erosion.
When roles become blurred
How dangerous is the confusion between institutional responsibility and personal authority?
It weakens the democratic system. When appointments are made based on considerations other than merit and institutional integrity, the ability of those institutions to act independently is compromised.
Is this primarily a constitutional issue or a matter of political culture?
It is both. From the early years of the Republic, there was no strong development of a constitutional culture. Instead, political dynamics often undermined institutional structures. That legacy continues to shape the system today.
Signs of institutional decline
Are there clear indications that this erosion is already happening?
Yes. One clear indicator is the low level of public trust in institutions. This makes it harder for institutions to function effectively, particularly during periods of crisis.
How do appointments to independent authorities affect democracy?
Independent bodies are essential checks on executive power. Their effectiveness depends on appointing individuals who meet high standards and can genuinely act independently.
The unresolved Cyprus problem
Paraskeva notes that any discussion of constitutional reform is complicated by the unresolved Cyprus issue. The absence of the Turkish Cypriot community raises fundamental questions about whether structural changes can be made unilaterally.
The continued lack of a political settlement, he argues, directly affects institutional balance, rights protection and the rule of law.
Can reforms be introduced without a solution to the Cyprus problem?
It is legally complex. While the Republic retains its international legal status, the bicommunal nature of the Constitution cannot be ignored. Any reform carries political and symbolic weight.
Can parliament play a stronger role as a counterbalance?
Strengthening institutional checks is essential. One example already in place is the requirement for parliamentary approval in certain appointments, such as the Commissioner for Administration and Human Rights.
Although this mechanism operates outside the strict constitutional framework, it functions as a practical form of oversight.
Paraskeva concludes that Cyprus is not trapped by its Constitution, but any effort to modernise it must take into account both its historical foundations and its political significance.