By Toumazos Tsielepis*
I considered it useful to comment on the recent public statements and disagreements between Averof Neophytou and Haris Georgiades regarding the 1978 Anglo-American-Canadian framework for a Cyprus settlement and the Ghali Set of Ideas. Certainly not with the intention of intervening in DISY's internal affairs, but because I believe that, especially now, when a new effort is under way to restart the negotiating process after a full nine years, we must have a correct understanding of the handling and policies of the past, so that similar mistakes may be avoided.
Mr Neophytou, among other things, attributes the “NO” to the 1978 Western Framework to AKEL. Certainly, better handling could have taken place but let us not forget that at the time the memories of the coup and the invasion, as well as NATO's undermining role, were still very fresh. In substance, however, that framework was not a lost opportunity, as many contend. A simple comparison with all subsequent United Nations plans is enough to demonstrate this.
As is well known, the agreed basis for negotiating and resolving the Cyprus problem for decades has safeguarded a single sovereignty, a single international personality and a single citizenship, and not by chance. These are precisely the most important elements distinguishing a federation from a confederation and from a two-state solution. The Western Framework suffered from serious shortcomings in this crucial area. It did refer to sovereignty, but without specifying that it would be single and indivisible, thereby leaving open the possibility of parallel sovereignty for the constituent states. It made absolutely no reference to international personality or citizenship.
The framework also contained other serious gaps regarding the basis of negotiations, including, among other things, the absence of any reference to a prohibition of secession and to safeguarding the unity of the federal state. It also left significantly fewer powers with the central government, compared with the relevant United Nations documents. Even worse, important powers such as citizenship and security were absent altogether, an omission that became even more problematic given that residual powers were left to the constituent states.
As regards Famagusta, it is not true that it would have been returned without any commitments. The provision for the return of the occupied city, in phases and depending on the progress of the talks, was an integral part of the Framework and, consequently, the obvious quid pro quo was acceptance of the Framework, with all its negative aspects, as mentioned above. It is worth remembering that only a few months later, the return of the city was provided for not merely in a third-party plan but in the 1979 High-Level Agreement itself, and unfortunately this contractual commitment has not been implemented to this day.
Consequently, Mr Neophytou is wrong when he says that the Western Framework was a lost opportunity. By contrast, he is correct in believing that history will hold DISY responsible for burying the Ghali Set of Ideas. Mr Georgiades’ claim that this is a completely unfair and unsubstantiated position comes as a surprise to any objective citizen who remembers DISY's erratic stance back in 1993. It is true that Glafcos Clerides supported Vasiliou's Cyprus policy, but suddenly, just a few months before the presidential elections, he transformed himself from a fervent supporter of the Ghali Ideas into one of their fiercest opponents. The facts speak for themselves and admit no dispute, and if necessary we shall return to them.
In this way, Glafcos Clerides won the 1993 elections. He inherited a very promising situation regarding the objectives of the Greek Cypriot side on the Cyprus problem. On 23 November 1993, before the presidential elections, then UN Secretary-General Boutros Ghali submitted his final report on Cyprus to the Security Council. That report constituted a devastating indictment of Denktash.
Among other things, the Secretary-General underlined:
“First and foremost, it is essential for the Turkish Cypriot side to adjust its positions, particularly with regard to its conception of federation, displaced persons and territorial adjustments, when the joint meetings resume in March 1993, so that these positions fall within the framework of the Set of Ideas” (para. 61).
Specifying this requirement, the Secretary-General also stressed, among other things, that:
“the area under the control of the Peacekeeping Force should, in accordance with resolution 550 (1984), be extended immediately to include Varosha” (para. 63, point 3).
Furthermore, the Secretary-General accused the Turkish Cypriot side of:
“relying on the notion that there are two sovereign states which would retain their sovereignty within a future federation”
and responded by invoking Resolution 750, which reaffirms a single sovereignty, a single international personality and a single citizenship (para. 48).
Further on, he stated that:
“the exceptions raised by the Turkish Cypriot side essentially preclude the possibility of the return of any displaced Greek Cypriots” (para. 50).
He also accused Denktash of seeking a situation in which the two communities would live separately and argued that the solution he wanted was incompatible with the Set of Ideas, which sought to take practical difficulties into account, but not in a manner that would abolish the right of return, property rights, and accepted international norms and practice (para. 55). He also attributed to him a refusal to accept the map contained in the Set of Ideas (para. 56).
Finally, the Secretary-General called on the Security Council to monitor developments closely, including the joint meetings after the presidential elections, and to consider any action it should take in order to achieve a speedy resolution of the Cyprus problem (concluding paragraph 67).
These, therefore, were the circumstances that Glafcos Clerides inherited on the Cyprus issue. All he had to do was await Denktash’s compliance, as demanded by the Secretary-General and by the Security Council, which adopted the report through Resolution 789. In that case, either there would have been a settlement, or all pressure would have been directed at the Turkish side, with all the beneficial consequences that would have flowed from that. In short, the key was to continue from where we had left off.
Instead, however, Mr Clerides agreed with the Turkish Cypriot leader to discuss ambitious confidence-building measures (CBMs), precisely in order to avoid discussion of the Set of Ideas. A year and a half later, he acknowledged that he could not continue along this path because, ultimately, CBMs themselves would end up becoming the solution to the Cyprus problem. Thus, we reached ground zero, and then began the well-known period of missile rhetoric, volcano rhetoric and doctrinaire rhetoric, which lasted until the end of Clerides’ first term.
To be fair, however, we must acknowledge that during his second term Glafcos Clerides made a sincere effort to achieve a settlement, but was unsuccessful, burdened by the legacy of his first term and facing Denktash across the table.
The important thing now is to look ahead. Revisiting the past is not an end in itself but a tool to help us avoid repeating the same mistakes. Today, we once again have before us an effort by the UN Secretary-General to put the Cyprus issue back on track and to continue from where we left off, so that his successor, if he so wishes, can complete the last mile.
For precisely this reason, the Secretary-General intends soon to place a document of convergences before the two leaders. From that point onwards, it is up to us whether we continue from where we left off or experiment with “new ideas”. If we do the former, there is hope. If not, we will once again repeat the mistakes of the past, and a solution to the Cyprus problem will remain an elusive dream.
*Toumazos Tsielepis is a lawyer and international relations specialist, former member of the negotiating team.
