By Yusuf Kanlı
Dionysis Dionysiou deserves credit for asking perhaps the most important question confronting Cyprus today: how can the two communities develop sufficient confidence not merely to sign a settlement but to implement and sustain it? At a time when much of the debate on the island remains trapped in familiar accusations and competing historical narratives, his effort to focus on trust rather than blame is an important contribution. Yet while his proposal for gradual implementation deserves careful consideration, it rests upon assumptions accepted almost exclusively by the Greek Cypriot side. If the next United Nations initiative is genuinely to become, in António Guterres’ words, one that “ought to be different,” it cannot simply reconstruct the logic of Crans-Montana. It must first understand why more than half a century of negotiations has repeatedly failed to produce a durable constitutional partnership.
Crans-Montana is not a template
One of the principal assumptions underpinning Dionysiou’s argument is that negotiations should continue from where they ended at Crans-Montana in 2017. Preserving the valuable convergences accumulated during decades of negotiations is undoubtedly sensible. The painstaking work completed on governance, territory, property, European Union affairs and institutional arrangements should not be discarded. Yet preserving previous convergences is fundamentally different from pretending that the political environment surrounding Cyprus has remained frozen since 2017.
Almost everything affecting the Cyprus question has changed. The Eastern Mediterranean has undergone profound geopolitical transformation. Türkiye’s relationship with the European Union has evolved considerably. Europe’s security environment has been reshaped by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Energy politics, migration and regional strategic competition have altered the context within which Cyprus now exists. Political realities within both communities have changed as well. This is why María Ángela Holguín has avoided presenting her mission as a simple revival of Crans-Montana. Her mandate has focused on rebuilding confidence, encouraging practical cooperation and determining whether sufficient political will exists for a fundamentally different process. That distinction is not procedural. It is political.
“This time ought to be different”
Since the collapse of Crans-Montana, Guterres has repeatedly observed that any future negotiating effort “ought to be different.” The phrase is often quoted but rarely analysed. Its significance extends beyond a call for goodwill. It reflects growing recognition within the United Nations that another open-ended negotiating exercise ending exactly like its predecessors would further undermine the credibility of the process itself.
Equally important, this principle did not originate with Turkish Cypriot leader Tufan Erhürman. Its intellectual roots reach back to the aftermath of the 2004 Annan Plan referenda. Following Turkish Cypriot approval and Greek Cypriot rejection of the plan, Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that Turkish Cypriots should no longer continue paying the political and economic consequences of division because of a decision over which they had no control. Although many of Annan’s recommendations to ease Turkish Cypriot isolation were never implemented, an important conceptual change entered United Nations thinking: political choices should carry political consequences. Erhürman’s insistence that another failed negotiation cannot simply restore the previous status quo should therefore not be viewed as a recent Turkish Cypriot invention. It reflects an evolution within UN thinking over more than two decades.
The forgotten constitutional balance
Understanding why negotiations repeatedly fail also requires revisiting the constitutional philosophy of the Republic established in 1960. Contemporary debates often focus on constitutional mechanisms while overlooking the balance those mechanisms were designed to preserve. The Republic was never intended to operate as a conventional majoritarian democracy. It was established as a partnership state balancing two constituent peoples internally and three guarantor powers externally. Political equality was expressed through effective participation, communal autonomy, distributed executive authority and constitutional safeguards preventing domination by either community.
That constitutional architecture effectively collapsed during the crisis of 1963-64, when Turkish Cypriots were excluded from the institutions of the partnership republic. Long before 1974, the internal constitutional balance upon which the Republic rested had already disappeared. This chronology remains fundamental because it explains why Turkish Cypriots approach political equality, constitutional safeguards and security through a historical perspective very different from that of Greek Cypriots. Recognising this divergence is not an exercise in assigning blame. It is an effort to understand why constitutional engineering alone has repeatedly proved insufficient.
Europe changed the external equilibrium
The accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the European Union in 2004 transformed not only the island’s international status but also the external equilibrium originally established in 1960. Whatever one’s legal interpretation of accession, its strategic consequences are difficult to dispute. Greece now enjoys permanent institutional influence over every important European decision concerning Cyprus. Türkiye, despite remaining one of the guarantor powers established under the 1960 order, possesses no comparable institutional role.
This does not require reopening Cyprus’ accession or questioning its legality. It does require acknowledging that any future comprehensive settlement seeking genuinely to restore constitutional balance cannot ignore this strategic asymmetry. Restoring political equality between the two constituent communities addresses only one half of the constitutional equation. The external balance also requires institutional arrangements capable of reassuring all principal actors that the strategic equilibrium has not permanently shifted in favour of one side.
The credibility deficit
Another challenge confronting future negotiations is credibility. Since intercommunal talks began under UN auspices in 1968, Cyprus has witnessed countless initiatives, high-level agreements, confidence-building measures, comprehensive settlement plans and diplomatic missions. Every process generated optimism before ending without a comprehensive settlement. Responsibility for these failures cannot honestly be assigned exclusively to either side. Different negotiations collapsed for different reasons. Nevertheless, from the Turkish Cypriot perspective one pattern has become increasingly difficult to ignore.
The community has repeatedly been encouraged to contemplate difficult constitutional compromises while the political consequences of failure have remained remarkably asymmetrical. The Annan Plan remains the clearest example. Turkish Cypriots accepted the most comprehensive settlement ever presented to the island. Greek Cypriots rejected it. Yet only days later the internationally recognised government entered the European Union while Turkish Cypriots remained politically and economically isolated. Whether this outcome was legally unavoidable or politically regrettable is ultimately less important than the political lesson many Turkish Cypriots drew from it: compromise did not necessarily alter their circumstances. That accumulated experience explains why the credibility of any future process has itself become a negotiating issue.
Building confidence before constitutions
For decades Cyprus diplomacy has concentrated overwhelmingly on what the final settlement should contain while paying less attention to how confidence between the two communities might develop before implementation begins. Constitutions establish institutions. They cannot legislate trust. Perhaps the traditional sequence should therefore be reversed. Instead of expecting constitutional agreement to create political confidence, diplomacy should first expand practical cooperation where both communities already share common interests.
Climate change, renewable energy, water management, migration, public health, organised crime, environmental protection and digital transformation require practical cooperation regardless of constitutional status. None requires prior agreement on every constitutional issue. Successful cooperation can gradually generate the confidence upon which constitutional partnership depends. The experience of European integration offers an instructive parallel. Political union did not begin with constitutional ambition but with practical cooperation producing tangible mutual benefit.
Cyprus enters the incentives phase
One characteristic distinguishes the current diplomatic effort from many previous initiatives. Increasingly, attention is shifting from constitutional engineering alone towards identifying incentives capable of persuading all principal actors that compromise serves their long-term interests. For Türkiye, these incentives include modernisation of the Customs Union, progress towards visa liberalisation, closer defence cooperation with Europe and a more constructive relationship with the European Union. For Turkish Cypriots, direct flights, direct trade, direct international contacts and fuller participation in European programmes remain longstanding priorities. For Greek Cypriots, the principal incentive remains a stable reunified state within the European Union while ending one of Europe’s longest unresolved conflicts.
These objectives are not mutually exclusive. Properly integrated into the negotiating methodology, they can become mutually reinforcing rather than contradictory. The European Union cannot remain a passive observer in this process. Brussels cannot replace the United Nations as mediator, but it possesses instruments indispensable to success. Only the EU can modernise the Customs Union, advance visa liberalisation, expand financial support and offer political and economic incentives capable of strengthening public support for compromise on both sides.
Türkiye’s indispensable role
No realistic discussion of Cyprus can ignore Türkiye’s central role. This is not merely because Türkiye remains one of the guarantor powers established by the 1960 Treaties, nor solely because of the military presence on the island. No comprehensive settlement can realistically be implemented, sustained or defended politically without Ankara’s support.
Reducing Türkiye’s role exclusively to guarantees and troop levels reflects an outdated understanding of regional realities. Türkiye’s interests today extend to regional stability, Eastern Mediterranean energy cooperation, migration management, trade, transportation, defence cooperation and the future of Türkiye-EU relations. If a Cyprus settlement becomes part of a wider strategic understanding between Ankara and Brussels, the incentives for sustaining that settlement will be stronger than if it remains an isolated constitutional exercise.
Leadership must address the fears of the other side
The burden of responsibility does not rest solely with international actors. The election of Tufan Erhürman has altered the political atmosphere. His long-standing commitment to a negotiated settlement, combined with his insistence that political equality and effective participation are prerequisites rather than negotiating objectives, has reopened channels of dialogue. President Nikos Christodoulides has likewise declared his commitment to substantive negotiations under the UN framework.
Declarations, however, are only the beginning. For the Turkish Cypriot leadership, this means recognising that Greek Cypriot concerns regarding territory, displaced persons, property and security are genuine societal anxieties. For the Greek Cypriot leadership, it means acknowledging that Turkish Cypriot insistence on political equality, effective participation and credible security is not a demand for privilege but a response to the collapse of the partnership republic, years of isolation and uncertainty about whether any future constitutional arrangement would endure. Negotiations become productive only when each side begins addressing the fears of the other rather than merely defending its own.
A settlement that can survive
Ultimately, the challenge confronting Cyprus is no longer simply negotiating another agreement. It is negotiating one capable of surviving. The Republic established in 1960 failed not because its constitutional provisions lacked sophistication but because one constituent people concluded that the constitutional order no longer protected its political existence. Future diplomacy should therefore resist measuring success solely by whether another conference is convened or another document produced. The more important question is whether any settlement possesses sufficient political legitimacy, institutional balance and strategic credibility to withstand the inevitable crises every democratic constitutional order experiences.
Neither side will obtain everything it seeks. Greek Cypriots will have to accept that Cyprus cannot simply revert to conventional majority rule. Turkish Cypriots will have to recognise that international legitimacy, European integration and common statehood require institutional compromises extending beyond their present position. Türkiye and Greece will likewise need to reconcile legitimate security concerns with a transformed regional environment. The key is not perfect satisfaction but balanced compromise.
Peace cannot be built on yesterday’s assumptions
Dionysiou has performed an important service by reopening a serious debate about methodology. My disagreement concerns neither his sincerity nor his commitment to reunification. It concerns the assumptions upon which reunification should be constructed. The next Cyprus process should preserve previous convergences without pretending that 2017 still defines today’s political reality. It should recognise political equality as the foundation of negotiations rather than one of their objectives. It should restore both the internal constitutional balance between the two constituent peoples and the broader strategic equilibrium that has gradually eroded. It should build constitutional partnership upon an expanding network of common interests rather than expecting constitutional texts alone to generate trust.
Perhaps this is the true meaning of Guterres’ observation that “this time ought to be different.” The difference should not consist merely of another envoy, conference or roadmap. It should consist of abandoning assumptions that six decades of experience have shown to be inadequate. Peace in Cyprus will not emerge because one community persuades the other to accept its historical narrative. It will endure only when both conclude that a carefully balanced constitutional partnership offers greater security, greater prosperity and greater dignity than the divided status quo they have managed for more than six decades. Only then will Cyprus move beyond negotiating coexistence and begin building a genuinely shared future.
