A persistent weakness in the foreign policy approach shaped by Nikos Christodoulides, first as foreign minister and now as President of the Republic of Cyprus, is the belief that Cyprus can act as though it is strategically unconstrained by the division of the island.
That is a mistake. Economics teaches us that interdependence affects decision making. This is especially poignant when one has to make strategic decisions, such as in foreign policy, where the actions of another party affect the efficacy of your own actions.
Cyprus is a divided island, with Turkish troops occupying its northern part. This allows Turkey, unconstrained by any current negotiations and efforts to solve the Cypriot division, to respond in Cyprus against any foreign policy decisions of the Republic of Cyprus which Turkey feels threaten its interests.
While it is understandable that president Christodoulides would like to emphasise the ability of the Republic of Cyprus to have strategic autonomy, the presence of the Turkish army in the northern part of the island means that possible Turkish reactions on the ground have to be considered in Cypriot foreign policy decisions.
If Turkish reactions on the ground are not considered, the key aim of the Republic of Cyprus’ foreign policy, a negotiated settlement of the division of the island, can be dangerously undermined. Two recent examples illustrate the point.
In March 2026, Cyprus asked Greece to deploy four F-16 fighter jets to the island to support its drone defence efforts after the British Sovereign Base Area was attacked by an Iranian drone. On one level, this improved Cyprus’ defensive capability. But this move was presented as a visible strengthening of the Greece-Cyprus military relationship. Turkey responded by sending six F-16 fighter jets to the occupied areas of Cyprus, increasing military tension.
In April 2026 the Republic of Cyprus signalled that it wanted to renegotiate the status of the UK Sovereign Base Areas. This is a popular position among many Greek Cypriots. However, there are strategic considerations, since the eastern UK base of Dhekelia touches territory controlled by the Turkish army. Thus, any discussion of renegotiation without considering this fact, can lead to Turkey seeking a response. On the 16th of April the Turkish army attempted to exercise control to an area near Pyla just to the west of the UK base of Dhekelia, producing the most serious escalation in that area since 2023.
In both cases, the same flaw in the Republic of Cyprus foreign policy is visible. The government acted as though the Republic of Cyprus could make strategically significant moves without triggering predictable responses from other powers already embedded in the island’s unresolved conflict.
Does this mean that Cyprus should not chart its own path? On the contrary, the interdependence should lead to the realisation that greater strategic autonomy can be realised only through the solution of the Cyprus problem, rather than the continuation of the island’s division. The Republic of Cyprus will have more room to act, not less, if it makes the resolution of the Cyprus problem its highest strategic priority, through which all other foreign policy actions are assessed and evaluated. A serious effort to restart negotiations is not a distraction from foreign policy. It is the precondition for a more effective foreign policy. That is the cost of ignoring interdependence. And it is a cost President Christodoulides keeps asking the Republic of Cyprus to pay.