Voice Across
The recent Politico interview with Greek Cypriot leader Nikos Christodoulides once again reveals a familiar pattern in his handling of the Cyprus problem. Partnership for Peace (PfP), NATO, EU–Türkiye relations, de-escalation frameworks, phased solutions. The vocabulary is expansive and strategically appealing. The framing is designed for Brussels, Washington and NATO capitals. Yet the fundamental deficiency remains unchanged. Cyprus itself, the island’s internal political balance and the will of the Cypriots who actually live here, remain secondary.
At its core, the Cyprus issue has never been about global security doctrines or alliance management. It has always been about coexistence, governance and political equality between two communities sharing the same island. By shifting the focus outward, Christodoulides relocates responsibility away from the island and into larger geopolitical arenas where accountability is blurred and progress can be indefinitely postponed.
This is not a step by step solution strategy. It is a step by step deferral strategy.
Transactional diplomacy disguised as vision
Christodoulides’ own words in the Politico interview illustrate this approach with unusual clarity. He speaks of a “step by step” process in which Cyprus’ participation in the PfP would be linked to Turkish “positive steps,” which would then unlock improvements in EU–Türkiye relations. As he puts it, the process would involve “steps from Turkey for Cyprus’ participation in PfP and, in parallel, positive steps in EU–Turkey relations, always combined with the resumption of talks for a Cyprus settlement within the agreed framework.”
This is not the language of reconciliation. It is the language of transaction.
Cyprus is presented less as a political problem requiring mutual compromise between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, and more as a bargaining chip in a broader strategic exchange. Security alignment becomes leverage. Dialogue becomes conditional. The substance of negotiations is subordinated to external incentives. In plain terms, this is horse trading dressed up as diplomacy.
The underlying message is unmistakable. The question is no longer what the two communities are prepared to concede to each other, but what Türkiye must deliver in exchange for Cyprus’ strategic repositioning. This approach does not de- escalate tensions. It externalises the conflict and turns Cyprus into a currency in negotiations where Cypriots themselves have limited agency.
Political equality
This pattern of avoidance was also evident during the first ever trilateral meeting chaired by UN Special Envoy María Ángela Holguín Cuéllar. Once again, Christodoulides affirmed his acceptance of political equality “as described in UN resolutions.” Yet when the discussion moved from abstract principle to concrete governance, the familiar hesitation resurfaced.
Since at least the Annan Plan period in 2004, the 2:1 rotation of the presidency has been the operational core of political equality. It is not an optional detail. It is the mechanism through which equality is made real. Accepting the concept while resisting its most tangible expression effectively empties it of substance.
For Turkish Cypriots, this is not a technical disagreement. It is the defining test of whether political equality is genuine or merely rhetorical. Each refusal reinforces a long standing perception that equality is tolerated only so long as it does not alter power relations.
Penalty clause and fear
Equally revealing is the persistent resistance to the so called penalty clause or the “No return to status quo” principle Erhürman has been demanding for the start of new full-fledged talks. The idea that if one side walks away from negotiations, the other should not once again be punished or left isolated is not a maximalist demand. It is a corrective born of experience.
More importantly, this principle has been repeatedly articulated by at least the last two UN secretaries general as essential for any credible negotiation process. Open ended talks with no consequences for rejection reward obstruction and punish compromise. Treating the penalty clause as unreasonable only reinforces the suspicion that delay, rather than resolution, remains the safer political choice.
Without accountability, courage becomes irrational. And without courage, negotiations become ritual.
Avoiding the obvious counterpart
Perhaps the most striking contradiction in Christodoulides’ approach lies in his reluctance to engage directly and seriously with the elected leader of the Turkish Cypriot community. Tufan Erhürman was elected with 63 percent of the vote. This is not a marginal mandate. It is a clear expression of political will.
Erhürman’s approach differs markedly from that of his predecessor. He has articulated a more pragmatic and solution oriented line. Yet instead of treating him as a genuine counterpart, the Greek Cypriot leadership continues to downgrade him, preferring indirect dialogue, symbolic gestures and external interlocutors.
This strategy weakens moderation rather than encouraging it. Leaders who are constantly sidelined rarely take political risks. Suspicion breeds caution, not compromise.
The question that will not go away
Ultimately, the Cyprus talks revolve around a question that Christodoulides has so far avoided answering clearly: what do Greek Cypriots actually want from this process?
The answer cannot remain ambiguous indefinitely.
Either Greek Cypriots are prepared to accept Turkish Cypriots as their political equals, as partners in a confederated Cyprus with effective participation and a rotating presidency, or they must accept the alternative reality that is steadily consolidating. There is no third option hidden in NATO formulas, EU presidencies or geopolitical abstractions.
If Erhürman is not treated as a legitimate counterpart in the search for a settlement, Türkiye will not fade from the picture. On the contrary, Türkiye will increasingly stand as a permanent and powerful neighbor across the northern third of the island, with all its political, economic and strategic weight. This is not a threat. It is the logical outcome of choices deferred and compromises avoided.
A choice between equality and permanence
Grand geopolitical narratives may sound visionary, but in reality they often do little more than repackage the status quo in more polished language. The Cyprus problem will not be resolved in Brussels corridors, NATO briefings or international security summits. If a settlement is ever reached, it will emerge on the island itself, through a political process that directly involves the two communities and the three guarantor powers.
That resolution requires direct political engagement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as equals. Not as leverage. Not as bargaining chips. As two equal partners.
If that engagement continues to be avoided, the outcome will not be uncertainty. It will be permanence. And responsibility for that permanence will rest squarely with those who chose to look everywhere except where the solution actually lies.
Yusuf Kanli, Executive Board member and Vice Chair of the Association of Journalists, Editorial Advisor of Anka News Agency, Journalist/Columnist.