The formal establishment of New Party (Yeni Parti) on July 24 represents much more than another split within Turkey’s frequently fragmented opposition. It is the political consequence of an extraordinary judicial intervention in the internal affairs of the Republican People’s Party, or CHP, and the beginning of a struggle over who possesses the democratic legitimacy to represent the country’s principal opposition constituency.
Özgür Özel and around 90 deputies resigned from the CHP in a coordinated move after the political and legal avenues for recovering control of the party appeared to have been exhausted. Reports differed slightly over whether the new parliamentary group would begin with 91 or 92 members, depending on whether Özel was counted separately. The political result, however, was clear: Yeni Parti immediately became the second-largest force in parliament, while the CHP was reduced to 44 deputies.
This is not the conventional birth of a minor breakaway organisation. Yeni Parti begins with a nationally recognised leader, an experienced parliamentary group, close relations with major municipalities and an established electoral constituency. It also claims that it, rather than the leadership restored to the CHP through a court ruling, represents the will expressed by party delegates and subsequently endorsed by voters in the 2024 local elections.
The central question is therefore not whether the CHP has divided. It plainly has. The decisive issue is whether Yeni Parti will become the principal democratic alternative to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan or whether fragmentation will ultimately benefit the governing alliance by dividing opposition voters, organisations and municipal administrations.
From congress dispute to political rupture
The crisis began with the court decision annulling the CHP’s 2023 congress, at which Özel defeated Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and became chairman. The ruling removed Özel and reinstated his predecessor, producing an unprecedented situation in which the leadership of Turkey’s oldest political party was determined not by its current delegates or members, but by a judicial judgment concerning an earlier congress.
The government maintains that the courts operate independently and that the case concerns alleged procedural irregularities rather than political intervention. Özel’s supporters and much of the opposition electorate see the matter differently. For them, removing an elected chairman and restoring a former leader amounted to a direct intervention in political competition, particularly after the CHP emerged from the 2024 local elections as the country’s leading party.
Özel initially resisted forming a separate organisation. He repeatedly described a new party as a contingency plan or “disaster scenario” that would be activated only if the CHP became incapable of participating freely in an election. His first preference was to recover the party through legal appeals, another congress or internal political mobilisation.
By July, however, his language had changed. Özel argued that the channels for remaining inside the CHP had been systematically blocked and presented the new movement as a democratic necessity rather than an act of personal revenge. His latest remarks have stressed that he would not accept a political order in which elected party leaderships could be replaced through judicial mechanisms and then required to treat the resulting arrangement as democratically legitimate.
When he signed the founding documents, Özel’s public words were restrained: “May it be beneficial for our country, our nation and all of us.” The meaning of the action was far less modest. He was declaring that he would not remain a powerless dissident inside a party whose leadership had been restored by court order. Instead, he would attempt to carry the CHP’s parliamentary, municipal and electoral centre of gravity into a new organisation.
Parliament changes overnight
The parliamentary transformation is immediate. The ruling Justice and Development Party remains by far the largest force, but Yeni Parti now occupies the institutional position traditionally associated with the main opposition. The CHP, despite retaining its historic name and legal identity, has fallen behind several parliamentary groups and faces the danger of becoming politically marginal.
The dispute is therefore developing into a contest between legal authority and political legitimacy. Kılıçdaroğlu controls the CHP machinery as a consequence of the court decision. Özel can claim that most deputies, much of the active organisation and a substantial portion of the electorate have followed him.
Yeni Parti will portray itself not as a movement that abandoned the CHP, but as the continuation of the political mandate created by the 2023 congress and strengthened by the 2024 municipal victories. The old party possesses the emblem, headquarters and institutional history. The new party claims the elected cadres, popular momentum and opposition programme.
For Erdoğan and the governing alliance, this creates opportunities as well as risks. In the short term, opposition fragmentation can be presented as proof of instability. The CHP and Yeni Parti may spend months competing over voters, personnel, municipalities and political legitimacy.
Yet the split could also release Özel from the institutional burdens and factional struggles that weakened the CHP for years. Yeni Parti may preserve social democratic and secular voters while appealing to younger, conservative or nationalist citizens who desire political change but remain hesitant to vote for the CHP because of its historic image.
Whether the split weakens or revitalises the opposition will depend on whether Yeni Parti develops into a credible national project or remains an emergency shelter for displaced CHP politicians.
The struggle for municipalities
The next major test will concern local government. The CHP’s victories in the 2024 municipal elections provided the political foundation of Özel’s leadership and the opposition’s principal source of administrative power. Many mayors elected under the CHP banner are believed to be closer to Özel than to the restored leadership.
Their choices will help determine whether Yeni Parti becomes a fully functioning national organisation. Municipal transfers would provide the party with experienced cadres, public visibility and a record of governance. Major municipalities also possess organisational networks capable of reaching voters despite a national media environment heavily favourable to the government.
The issue remains politically sensitive. The CHP leadership will argue that mayors were elected under its emblem and should respect that mandate. Özel’s camp will respond that they were elected as part of a programme and leadership coalition later overturned by judicial intervention.
The position of Istanbul Mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu remains central. Özel has emphasised continued loyalty to İmamoğlu, whose imprisonment has transformed him into a symbol of the wider opposition struggle. Yeni Parti’s presidential strategy will remain closely tied to his legal and political fate.
Polling momentum, but no guarantee
Early opinion surveys have shown strong potential support for an Özel-led party. Some scenarios placed Yeni Parti at around 35 percent, ahead of the AK Party, while reducing the Kılıçdaroğlu-led CHP to the low single digits.
Such results demonstrate the seriousness of the legitimacy crisis facing the restored CHP leadership. A large section of opposition voters appears prepared to follow Özel, İmamoğlu and the municipal cadres rather than remain loyal to the historic party label regardless of who controls it.
Nevertheless, hypothetical surveys conducted during a political shock often measure immediate anger and solidarity rather than durable voting behaviour. Yeni Parti must still announce a programme, establish provincial organisations, select candidates and withstand sustained pressure from both the government and the CHP.
The reliable conclusion is therefore not that Yeni Parti is certain to win an election. It is that Özel begins with unusually strong support for a new organisation and that the CHP can no longer assume automatic voter loyalty to its name and emblem.
Kılıçdaroğlu’s difficult position
Kılıçdaroğlu’s initial reaction has been cautious. He reportedly instructed supporters not to attack departing deputies and argued that the CHP should not become an “opposition to the opposition.” Such restraint is politically rational. A bitter campaign against Özel could reinforce the perception that the restored leadership depends more on judicial authority than electoral support and might accelerate further resignations.
Restraint, however, cannot resolve the CHP’s central problem. Kılıçdaroğlu must explain why voters should accept a leadership restored by a court instead of one chosen at a congress. He must also demonstrate that the CHP can remain electorally relevant after losing most of its parliamentary group and potentially significant parts of its local organisation.
The CHP’s history remains a considerable asset. Founded by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, it holds an exceptional place in the political memory of the republic. But history alone does not guarantee survival. Parties endure when they continue to represent living social coalitions, not merely when they retain valuable symbols and headquarters.
An early-election campaign
Yeni Parti will intensify demands for an early election through the slogan “Geçim yoksa seçim var,” or “If there is no livelihood, there must be an election.” Economic hardship, declining purchasing power and public frustration provide a powerful basis for that campaign.
Its parliamentary group, however, cannot force an election alone. Yeni Parti possesses influence but not sufficient numbers to reach the constitutional threshold without cooperation from other parties. Its real leverage will depend on whether it can consolidate opposition voters, attract major municipalities and maintain strong opinion-poll support.
If it succeeds, Erdoğan may eventually conclude that choosing the timing of an election is preferable to allowing economic and political conditions to deteriorate. If Yeni Parti becomes consumed by organisational disputes or a prolonged confrontation with the CHP, the government will have every incentive to wait.
A democratic precedent
The most important dimension of the crisis is not parliamentary arithmetic but democratic principle. Political parties are constitutional actors through which citizens organise and compete for public power. Courts may investigate fraud or procedural illegality, but overturning a party congress and restoring a previous chairman inevitably affects electoral competition.
The intervention also raises questions about the authority of electoral institutions. Internal party elections and congresses form part of the broader democratic order. When lower courts determine political leadership, the boundary between judicial supervision and the usurpation of electoral authority becomes dangerously blurred.
Normalising court-appointed or court-restored party leadership would establish a precedent extending far beyond the CHP. Any opposition or governing party could eventually face similar intervention. Özel’s decision should therefore be understood not merely as an attempt to protect his position, but as a rejection of the proposition that political leadership may be judicially rearranged and then presented as democratically unquestionable.
A new beginning or a temporary refuge?
Yeni Parti begins with what most new political movements spend years trying to acquire: lawmakers, public recognition, experienced personnel, municipal connections and strong polling potential. What it does not yet possess is institutional durability.
It must transform anger into organisation, sympathy into membership and parliamentary strength into a credible prospect of government. It must develop clear policies on the economy, democratic reform, the Kurdish question, migration and foreign affairs while managing the ambitions of figures representing different opposition constituencies.
The party must also avoid becoming consumed by its quarrel with the CHP. Its principal political opponent must remain Erdoğan’s government, not the diminished organisation it left behind.
July 24, 2026, will nevertheless be remembered as a turning point. Turkey now has a new parliamentary opposition force, a historic party fighting for survival and an electorate being asked whether political continuity resides in an institution’s name or in the representatives, voters and programme that once gave that institution its power.
