By Haris Papageorgiou, Director of Noverna Analytics
In the aftermath of last Sunday’s parliamentary elections, the political reading of the final result is important but insufficient on its own to produce accurate conclusions within a comprehensive evaluation framework. A more holistic interpretation of the outcome emerges from scientific analysis of the vote, combined with trends within the electorate as recorded in the Politis longitudinal surveys conducted between February and May during the campaign period.
Last-minute movements
The final Noverna poll for Politis, completed around two weeks before the parliamentary elections, captured a highly fluid political landscape, with more than one in five voters – around 22 per cent – declaring themselves undecided about their final choice. At the same time, a similar proportion said there was a possibility they might change their party preference.
A rational analysis of last-minute voter shifts within the broader political environment is therefore necessary in order to understand the final outcome.
A return to the traditional parties
In the final Politis survey, two thirds (66 per cent) of undecided voters who had also voted in the previous parliamentary elections came largely from the three traditional parties: DISY, AKEL and DIKO.
It is evident that the overwhelming majority of these voters ultimately moved back and “returned home” to their parties, reinforcing the final electoral percentages achieved on 24 May.
As to why this occurred, particularly in a climate of widespread scepticism towards the traditional political system, several factors appear to have played a decisive role. Again, based on the final Noverna poll for Politis, almost two in five voters (39 per cent) said they would take into account, at least to some extent, the presence of parties and their candidates in televised debates during the final two weeks of the campaign. This figure was higher even than the potential influence of social media (37 per cent).
It is highly likely that the performance of leaders and candidates from DISY, AKEL and DIKO inspired greater confidence and reassurance compared with representatives of newly formed anti-establishment groupings. In any case, it is clear that television exposure – and above all the image projected through it – remains an extremely important tool for achieving last-minute voter mobilisation. At the same time, this repositions social media as more effective when operating in a complementary role alongside traditional campaign practices and conventional media.
Local presence and breadth of outreach
The momentum that developed in favour of the traditional parties was also decisively supported by their organisational structures, in contrast to the newer anti-establishment parties.
This was primarily reflected in the strong presence of party teams and organised groups at local and community level, which expand and sustain a large potential voter base. In an election where the personal appeal of candidates plays a significant role, the ability to promote them in every community and village becomes critical, while the backing of the party machine ultimately works to the benefit of the entire political camp.
AKEL, DISY and DIKO fully capitalised on this advantage. By contrast, the three main anti-establishment parties were confined to narrower fields of penetration, while also facing the risk of functioning as communicating vessels competing for essentially the same electorate, united by disappointment with the traditional party system.
As recorded both in polls and in the final result, Volt showed limited momentum, mainly within the urban centre of Nicosia. ALMA displayed weaknesses at district level, particularly in Famagusta, Larnaca and Paphos, while Direct Democracy relied from the outset – and deliberately – on a digital model of political mobilisation, which by its nature lacks direct personal contact with voters.
ALMA falters, ELAM nears its ceiling
In ALMA’s case, the final ballot result essentially confirmed the trend recorded in polls over the two months preceding the elections.
From February to April, ALMA was shown to be losing around one third of its initial electoral appeal, with this trend intensifying during the final two weeks before polling day. Longitudinal data consistently indicated that fewer than half of its voters were certain about their choice – a pattern that was ultimately reflected at the ballot box.
Interpreting ELAM’s result is more complex. In numerical terms and compared with 2016, the percentage it achieved can reasonably be considered a success. However, for a party that entered the campaign with polling support of around 13.5 per cent in clarified voting intention, its final result of under 11 per cent may suggest it is approaching its electoral “ceiling”, at levels lower than comparable parties in Western Europe.
The first Noverna poll for Politis showed that a significant share of citizens viewed the migration issue as largely manageable or resolved, depriving ELAM of one of its core areas of political differentiation. At the same time, the incorporation of three former DISY figures appears to have weakened rather than strengthened the party’s “pure” anti-establishment profile. Meanwhile, the heavy emphasis on social issues, such as opposition to same-sex marriage, does not appear to have translated into additional electoral support.
Put simply, ELAM is now being forced to search for a new political rationale.
The agenda of policy positions
Within the overall analysis of the election outcome, the impact of political agendas and clearly articulated policy positions requires a more realistic interpretation.
During the campaign, the larger traditional parties – particularly AKEL on cost-of-living pressures and housing policy, and DISY on economic and European affairs – succeeded in projecting the image of comprehensive political organisations with coherent programmes.
By contrast, newly emerged parties relied heavily on personality-driven campaigns centred on Odysseas Michaelides, Fidias Panayiotou or Christoforos Tornaritis. Personalities proved important up to a point, but ultimately what mattered was the overall political package and the image of a party offering concrete proposals and an organised political identity.
This is what provides undecided voters with a sense of reassurance and trust, especially in the final days before polling.
The critical question for smaller parties
What remains, then, in terms of substance and political agenda for smaller parties that operated primarily around single issues or personalities?
If the Cyprus problem appears to be losing the dominant position it once held in public consciousness, if migration is widely seen as largely manageable, and if the fight against corruption failed to act as a decisive electoral catalyst, smaller parties are left facing a difficult but crucial question: what is their long-term reason for existence?
A party built around Odysseas, a party of Fidias, a party of Tornaritis, or a party defined exclusively by the Cyprus problem does not, on its own, appear sufficient to generate sustained political appeal within Cypriot society.
