If in 2023, Christodoulides was elected as the candidate of a diverse but functional alliance, today the data show that this alliance has weakened, the party landscape has been reshaped and the next two years may prove politically far more challenging than the first phase of his presidency.
The arithmetic
The first and most crucial element concerns the very arithmetic of his election. Nicos Christodoulides was not elected in 2023 as the candidate of a major traditional party mechanism, but as the product of an alliance of so-called centrist parties, combined with significant defections from DISY and tolerance or support from voters across other political spaces in the second round. DIKO, DIPA and EDEK, which formed his core organisational backbone, then represented roughly 25% of the electorate. Today, based on the parliamentary results, their combined electoral strength has dropped to around 17%.
This is not simply a numerical loss. It reflects a political weakening of the President’s key allies. And because he does not possess his own party machinery, this shift carries particular weight. Unlike a president backed by a strong party structure, Christodoulides depends heavily on maintaining his personal electoral appeal and his ability to assemble broader political majorities.
DISY
At the same time, DISY emerges from the parliamentary elections with significantly renewed confidence. Its 27.1% victory is not just an electoral success. It represents political restoration. After the 2023 defeat and the internal crisis that followed, the party shows that it remains the strongest organised political force in the country. This changes the balance of power in relation to the 2028 presidential race.
The key question is whether this success increases the likelihood of DISY running independently with its own candidate. With current data, the answer is probably yes. A party that comes first with nearly 28% is unlikely to easily accept supporting again a president who emerged from a split within its own ranks, unless exceptional conditions arise. The party’s psychology is shifting from defence to assertion.
This does not exclude cooperation. Cyprus’s political history shows that presidential elections often override party lines. However, the likelihood of DISY seeking to return to power independently now appears clearly increased.
The challenges ahead
At the same time, the new composition of parliament may create a demanding environment for the government. In a presidential system, the executive is not overthrown through a vote of no confidence, as in parliamentary systems. However, this does not mean that parliament cannot inflict significant political wear.
Difficulty in passing legislation, amendments to government proposals, rejection of key reforms or the formation of ad hoc opposition majorities can seriously undermine government work. If the President appears unable to advance his core policies, the perception of effectiveness is weakened.
And this is precisely where one of Christodoulides’s greatest risks lies: erosion through stagnation. Constitutionally, a Cypriot President cannot be removed, but politically he can be weakened if the image emerges of a government unable to govern.
The role of DIKO
A crucial factor will also be the stance of his current allies, especially DIKO. Nikolas Papadopoulos finds himself in a delicate political position. On one hand, participation in government provides access to power and influence. On the other, there is always the risk of political absorption, whereby the party loses autonomy without corresponding electoral benefit.
If DIKO concludes that its role in government does not yield political gains, its choices may shift. An interesting hypothetical scenario arises: what would happen if Nikolas Papadopoulos accepted a political proposal for the presidency of the House from another bloc?
Such a development would have serious implications. Not only because the Speaker’s post is a high-profile institutional position, but also because it would signal a broader realignment of the political landscape. Neither DISY nor AKEL would support such a move while DIKO remained in government. If Papadopoulos were to distance himself from the government, the governing bloc would weaken significantly.
Of course, such a scenario is not simple. DIKO would need to weigh the costs of withdrawal, its relationship with the President and its own presidential ambitions. Papadopoulos himself would have to decide whether his interests lie in remaining a government partner, becoming an independent contender or positioning himself as a power broker.
The ELAM factor
Adding to this is the variable of ELAM. While the result did not confirm the most aggressive predictions of a surge, the party remains a significant actor. Its stance in future presidential elections could prove decisive, especially if the second round becomes closely contested.
However, the key question for Christodoulides is not who supported him in 2023, but whether he can convince voters again as president. Being elected as a candidate of change is different from seeking re-election as an incumbent. Then, he could promise renewal. In 2028, he will be judged on his record.
If by then he delivers government work, maintains high personal approval and manages parliamentary challenges, he remains competitive. But if the next two years are marked by political deadlock, institutional friction and weakening allies, the path to a second term will become extremely difficult.
With today’s data, Nicos Christodoulides remains a significant player for 2028. But for the first time since his election, his re-election no longer appears a given.
By Kostas Zachariades
