The dismissal proceedings concerning Judge Doria Varosiotou have entered their final phase, as both sides presented their closing arguments before the Supreme Constitutional Court of Cyprus, sitting as the Supreme Constitutional Judicial Council for the purposes of this case.
During yesterday’s hearing, the Council heard summaries of the arguments submitted by Achilleas Demetriades, legal counsel for Varosiotou, and Polys Polyviou, representing the Supreme Judicial Council. Both lawyers had previously submitted extensive written pleadings. The presiding judge announced that the Council would reserve judgment, with a final decision to be issued as soon as possible. The specific date of the ruling will be communicated in due course.
Main arguments
Representing Varosiotou, Demetriades stated that his arguments focus on three central areas: the facts that have been accepted by both sides; a preliminary objection raised by the opposing side, which he characterised as inadmissible; and the ten grounds cited for annulling the Judicial Council’s decision to terminate her appointment.
He raised concerns about the absence of two key meeting minutes, dated 11 and 16 June 2025, from the termination decision. According to him, the lack of explanation for their omission from the record raises significant questions.
“We are not challenging the appointment - we are challenging the dismissal,” Demetriades stressed. “We are objecting to the manner in which the dismissal was carried out. The Constitution prohibits judicial appointments on a probationary basis. There is no legal, regulatory or constitutional framework that allows this. She was eligible for permanent appointment, not a probationary one. In the absence of any framework, her appointment - however it was labelled - was de facto permanent.”
“She wasn’t a ‘slightly permanent’ judge,” he added. “She was a full judge, issuing rulings. Were her decisions ‘slightly’ decisions?”
Demetriades also argued that Varosiotou was never given a hearing prior to her dismissal, thereby denying her a fundamental right to be heard.
Counterargument
In response, Polyviou argued that Varosiotou had explicitly accepted the terms of her probationary appointment, thus accepting the authority of the Supreme Judicial Council over the process. He maintained that the appointment itself was a distinct legal act which cannot be challenged as part of the current proceedings, since doing so would amount to a de facto review of the original appointment decision.
Polyviou invoked the legal principle of estoppel, arguing that one cannot simultaneously accept and reject the same legal act. “She accepted the offer of appointment, including the probation clause, without any reservation, protest or other formal objection,” he said.
He also highlighted the judicial oath Varosiotou had taken, in which she pledged to “faithfully serve the Republic of Cyprus in the office of probationary district judge.” This, he argued, further solidifies the legitimacy of the appointment terms.
Polyviou concluded that Varosiotou had fully accepted and benefited from her appointment, including its probationary terms, and that any challenge at this stage essentially disputes the original appointment, not just its termination. He emphasised that the Supreme Judicial Council acted within its constitutional mandate, as defined under Article 157.2 of the Constitution and Law 33/1964.