The coming months are poised to bring significant shifts to Cyprus’ domestic and international affairs, with major consequences set to unfold primarily in 2026. Key to this period will be the Turkish‑Cypriot leadership election, anticipated judicial rulings, and developments over the Palestinian and Ukrainian conflicts, all likely to leave a marked imprint. Together, and combined with the state of the economy, they may also influence the outcome of the parliamentary elections scheduled for May next year, as well as the longer‑term presidential contest in 2028.
Turkish‑Cypriot elections
The forthcoming election among the Turkish‑Cypriot community will be decisive for the future of the Cyprus question. A victory by Ersin Tatar (backed by the National Unity Party (UBP)) would, given his stated support for sovereignty equality, a two‑state solution and implementation of the so‑ called “3D” proposals, likely preserve the status quo. Under such a scenario, Turkey and the UBP would maintain their “race against time” strategy, seeking to elevate the northern entity‑region militarily and demographically, while encroaching on Greek‑Cypriot property rights and eroding the Turkish‑Cypriot cultural identity. An election of Tatar would not, in the near or medium term, alleviate the isolation of Turkish‑Cypriots, remedy their flagging economy, or halt the gradual assimilation of the north into Turkey.
Should Tufan Erhürman (leader of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP)) prevail, matters take on a new dimension. His election would signal Turkey’s adoption of the approach of Hakan Fidan, looking to reopen all fronts of engagement with the West, including the Greek‑Turkish and Cyprus dossiers. Under such a mandate the Turkish‑Cypriot leader would be, under certain conditions, willing to return to negotiations for a Bizonal‑Bicommunal Federation, provided the Greek‑Cypriot side explicitly recognises political equality as defined at Crans‑Montana. He also demands a timeline for concluding such talks and insists that if they fail (particularly due to the Greek‑Cypriot side), the Turkish‑Cypriots cannot revert to the previous status‑quo (i.e., the Republic of Cyprus remaining the sole recognised state and the north remaining a pseudo‑state). If elected, Erhürman is expected to travel to Ankara for consultations with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and if his positions are endorsed, return to Nicosia seeking a meeting with Nikos Christodoulides. For the Greek‑Cypriot side, this opens the possibility of a series of confidence‑building measures, particularly the opening of additional crossing points.
The hard part will follow: the Greek‑Cypriot leadership must implement in practice the elements indicated by President Christodoulides resuming the process where it left off at Crans‑Montana. This would mean rotational presidency, Turkish‑Cypriot political equality coupled with effective participation in governance, such as a Turkish‑Cypriot minister’s vote, at least on issues of fundamental community interest. What remained undetermined were the subjects where that effective vote would apply (as drafted by negotiators Mavroyiannis‑Nami in 2019) and the mechanism to resolve disagreements between President and Vice‑President. If the Greek‑Cypriot side is genuinely committed, one could expect internal friction and possible rearrangements in the party scene: will DIKO, EDEK, ELAM and the Church continue to support the President? What will DISY and AKEL do? Leaderships express support, but will Christodoulides persuade DIKO? The fundamental question remains: will a return to substantive talks on Cyprus, with a clear timeline, influence the outcome of next May’s parliamentary elections?
Corruption
The findings of the Anti‑Corruption Authority regarding Nicos Anastasiades and other accused individuals, as well as several outstanding decisions of the Legal Service (notably the Koumas case, documents at Central Prisons, Takata affair, Sizopoulos) could become decisive in shaping the dominant narrative ahead of the parliamentary elections. Should favourable (and thinly‑justified) acquittals emerge, particularly in the former President’s case, public perception of systemic corruption could deepen, boosting parties that present themselves as anti‑establishment. Some observers argue that such a development might elevate Odysseas Michaelides as the frontrunner for the 2028 presidency, given his enduring popular backing despite his previous conviction and removal by the Supreme Court. Survey data strongly suggest that citizens place corruption high among the island’s core problems - so deep is the scepticism towards institutions (government, parties, police, legal service) that anti‑system narratives play into the hands of parties such as ELAM, VOLT and the new party of Fidias Panayiotou, all claiming to stand outside the system.
The Palestinian issue
Whether the Palestinian question is resolved or not, and beyond the potential Nobel prize expected to be awarded to Donald Trump in 2026 - will certainly affect the Eastern Mediterranean region, including Cyprus. A peace settlement might position Cyprus as a hub for transferring building materials and food to Palestinians in the months ahead, while reviving scenarios for energy pipelines and interconnections. What is most awaited, however, is the evolution of Turkey–Israel relations and the zones of influence claimed by the two main regional players in respect of Syria, Lebanon and the Palestinians themselves. What will Cyprus’s role be in a new political alignment, or possibly a broader confrontation, given that both Israel and Turkey have drawn the island into their rivalry? If the Turkey–Israel confrontation continues, what becomes of the Cyprus settlement given that Nicosia has already aligned with Israel? There is already a link between the Cyprus and Greek‑Turkish issues. If Turkey–Israel relations come into the equation, the complexity of the settlement deepens far beyond present contours. On the other hand, if relations are normalised, the shifting balance of alliances/co‑operations in the region will alter Cyprus’s room for manoeuvre.
The Ukraine war
If an agreement or cessation of the war in Ukraine emerges, the benefits for Cyprus would be primarily economic. A de‑escalation in the Black Sea would reduce shipping insurance premiums and commodity risks, benefitting the Cyprus‑registered merchant fleet. It would also ease sanctions on Russia, allow the return of Russian tourists, lower oil prices and create a more favourable environment for energy investments in Cyprus (interconnectors, renewables, gas). On the other hand, Turkey would gain bargaining power as a maritime‑gateway and controller of the Straits, emerging closer to President Erdoğan’s objective of re‑engineering Turkey as a regional super‑power. That scenario cannot materialise unless Turkey secures full dominance over Hamas and joins the moderate Muslim axis (currently including the Gulf Arab states and Egypt). In that case, Cyprus and Greece could cooperate with Turkey in the region as the EU‑closest states.
Parliamentary elections
Any of the above four developments - whether positive or negative - stand to profoundly influence Cyprus’s political landscape. The persistence of corruption fuels populism and brings into power individuals ill‑equipped to manage the island’s regional and domestic challenges. Only genuine accountability can arrest this dynamic. The Cyprus settlement has historically drawn together so‑called hard‑line parties and brought AKEL and DISY closer, setting aside ideological differences. The issue now largely concerns the President himself, who was elected with the support of those skeptical of settlement, but to resolve the Cyprus question, as he claims, he will depend on those who currently oppose him. If Erhürman’s election triggers a settlement, neither the May parliamentary elections nor the 2028 presidency will carry the same weight because Christodoulides might at that point become candidate for the first President of a Cypriot Federation.
A settlement could potentially advance more easily if consensual and integrative processes are pursued in our region, yielding benefits for all stakeholders. The past 51 years of deadlock have shown that pressure on both sides is necessary, and where it has been applied we have seen progress, recently in the Palestinian case, and perhaps soon in Ukraine and, why not, Cyprus.