On 19 October 2025, Turkish Cypriots elected, from the very first round, their new leader Tufan Erhürman with 63% of the vote against 36% for former leader Ersin Tatar. The result signals more than a mere change of guard. The 55-year-old Law professor, former “prime minister” of the north and head of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), who once played a significant role in the Cyprus talks (2008-2010), has pledged support for restarting negotiations between the two sides with the aim of reunifying the island under a federal settlement.
Erhürman’s resounding victory is not simply an internal development for the Turkish-Cypriot community. It sends messages across the island to both sides and beyond, to Ankara and the international community, about the Cyprus problem, the future of the talks, relations with Turkey, and the relationship between Turkish and Greek Cypriots. His win shows that the game is still on; it injects fresh momentum into the Cyprus problem - with new possibilities but also serious risks for the status quo.
Political significance
Tatar’s tenure had been defined by his insistence on the “two-state” model - a confederal approach that neither Greek Cypriots nor the European Union could accept, given the wider implications for other member states. Erhürman’s election is widely read as the Turkish-Cypriot community’s choice for a more pragmatic, European-minded and negotiation-based path. The international community now expects both sides to prove they mean it when they claim readiness to resume talks.
Here lies the real test for the Greek-Cypriot leadership. Under Tatar, Nicosia enjoyed relatively easy ground in the European corridors, projecting readiness for dialogue while highlighting Ankara and Tatar’s unacceptable “two-state” stance. President Nikos Christodoulides, flanked by hardliners and still carrying the reputation of a hidden rejectionist, must now demonstrate genuine willingness for substantive dialogue and compromise, leading to a solution that will please neither side entirely.
Talks will resume
Both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot political figures long involved in the Cyprus issue, as well as foreign diplomats following developments closely, believe that negotiations will resume sooner rather than later. They expect a process bound by a timetable - not an open-ended one - and possibly with a predetermined outcome should talks collapse due to Greek-Cypriot responsibility, a key demand from the Turkish-Cypriot side which insists that the status quo cannot continue.
The coming months are expected to serve as a preparatory phase: efforts to build a positive climate on the island through social meetings, constructive statements by both leaders, implementation of confidence-building measures, work by the bi-communal technical committees, and structured exchanges among civil-society actors from both sides.
The UN roadmap
According to a preliminary UN roadmap (not yet finalised), the Secretary-General’s envoy María Ángela Holguín will return to the island in early December - Erhürman has said their meeting is set for 5 December 2025. In spring, a new expanded tripartite meeting is planned - once President Christodoulides finds an available date, as Cyprus will hold the rotating EU Council Presidency in the first half of 2026.
The actual resumption of talks is projected for the second half of 2026, after the parliamentary elections and once, as one foreign diplomat put it, “the Cypriot President has his feet back on the ground, because right now his overconfidence knows no bounds.” The same diplomat identifies July as the “critical month”, with the UN aiming for tangible progress before Secretary-General António Guterres leaves office. Since a comprehensive solution seems out of reach, Guterres appears to focus on securing an “interim agreement” before the end of 2026 - a more realistic goal.
Efforts are also under way for Guterres to update his 2017 Framework, so that both sides stop interpreting it differently.
“Come - if you mean it”
Turkish Cypriots now in charge of their community, following the 19 October vote, are deeply disappointed with Greek-Cypriot politicians. They feel deceived, convinced that Nicosia’s aim is not a true bizonal, bicommunal federation (BBF) but a Greek-Cypriot-dominated state wrapped in a federal label - hence, in their view, the constant delays designed to buy time.
“We’re waiting - come, if you want. We won’t beg you. If you want to move forward together, now is the time. But to take, you must also give,” a Turkish-Cypriot politician told Politis, requesting anonymity. “Otherwise we’ll move on our own - and we may still secure gains within the EU. Sadly, that would mean further assimilation by Turkey… There were unique opportunities under Talat–Christofias and Akıncı–Anastasiades; there’s another now with Erhürman–Christodoulides. If we can’t make it this time, we never will.”
The goal: an arrangement
A Greek-Cypriot source closely linked to Turkish-Cypriot politics told Politis that the message from the northern ballot box was not explicitly pro-federal. “It was a rejection of the status quo and an expression of desire for integration into the international community as an organised, autonomous entity. If a federal settlement guarantees that, fine - if not, then two states, a confederation, or hybrid formulas could be discussed.”
He added that discussions now revolve around a looser federation - fewer central powers than the 25 agreed under Anastasiades–Akıncı (to avoid deadlocks and enhance functionality) but still maintaining a single, viable federal state.
The other major issue, he noted, remains security - the source of mutual fears. “Greek Cypriots worry that political deadlock could invite new Turkish intervention, while Turkish Cypriots cannot forget the pre-1974 period.”
Between federation and confederation
Erhürman represents what scholars call the “modern Turkish-Cypriot nationalism” - the belief that coexistence with Greek Cypriots is possible only if the community is shielded from both Hellenisation and Ankara’s growing assimilation. The current status quo allows Turkey to further Turkify the north.
While pragmatic, Erhürman and his camp will not accept a settlement defined by Greek-Cypriot perceptions. They seek a federation with political equality and effective participation - including a positive vote in all Cabinet decisions.
A 7–4 ministerial composition with at least one Turkish-Cypriot and two Greek-Cypriot positive votes has been agreed, a formula seen as more functional than the 1960 Constitution’s veto system.
Distrust and red lines
The new Turkish-Cypriot leadership embodies four core realities:
(a) deep mistrust towards all Greek Cypriot leaders;
(b) the belief that for 20 years Greek Cypriots have failed to share power even when facing progressive Turkish-Cypriot partners;
(c) the desire to escape isolation through talks that carry clear timetables and no return to the pre-talks status quo; and
(d) the conviction that a BBF without political equality is meaningless.
When Greek Cypriots challenge that equality, they essentially step outside the agreed framework as Tatar did, because a federation cannot function on majority-minority logic.
A fine line
Cyprus is entering a critical phase. The question is whether its leaders have the resolve and strategic depth to manage the risk and achieve a result. Otherwise, another collapse looms, after which the Greek-Cypriot side may no longer have counterparts across the divide.
The harsh truth is that the UN and the wider international community have concluded that Greek Cypriots are not sincere about power-sharing. Hence, they are exploring hybrid arrangements that hover between federation and loose federation - effectively bordering on confederation - to accommodate both the Turkish-Cypriot demand for autonomy and the Greek-Cypriot reluctance to truly co-govern.
It is along this fine line that the island’s future now hangs.
The title paraphrases a lyric by Odysseas Ioannou from the song “To paignídi paízetai” performed by Vasilis Papakonstantinou — “The game is still on.”